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This study aims to assess to what extent the institutional environment is responsible for world-
wide differences in economic development. To answer this question, a new concept of the in-
stitutions-augmented Solow model is constructed. The analysis covers 153 countries and the 
period 1994-2009. The empirical analysis confirms a large positive impact of the quality of the 
institutional environment on the level of economic development. This positive link has been 
evidenced for all six of the employed institutional indicators (although nonlinearities are present 
in some cases). Our own concept of the institutions-augmented Solow model fits the empirical 
data very well. It turns out that differences in physical capital, human capital and the institutional 
environment (which is measured by the governance indicator) explain approximately 75% of 
the differences in economic development among the countries of the world. According to the 
institutions-augmented Solow model, the production function that is consistent with the empiri-
cal data is Y = K0.372H0.315L0.313Q0.705, where K is the physical capital, H is the human capital, L is the 
labor and Q represents the institutional indicator.
Introduction
The economic growth and economic development of 
countries both depend on many factors. Using the 
most common classification, we can divide these fac-
tors into two groups: the demand-side determinants 
and the supply-side determinants. The first group en-
compasses the variables that create GDP according to 
the following equation: Y = C + I + G + NX, where C 
denotes consumption, I denotes investments, G de-
notes government spending on goods and services, 
and NX denotes the net exports. Except for consump-
tion, which is not an autonomous factor because of 
its dependence on output, the remaining variables 
can be regarded as economic growth determinants, 
as confirmed by the Keynesian model. The second 
group of factors includes the supply-side determi-
nants that are directly related to the macroeconomic 
production function. The most common production 
function takes the form Y = F(K, H, L, A), where K 
denotes the physical capital, H denotes the human 
capital, L denotes the labor and A denotes the tech-
nology. These variables influence the potential output 
and are economic growth determinants in the classi-
cal model. Of course, both demand-side and supply-
side variables can be more disaggregated and include 
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inter alia various types of investments or government 
spending or many more types of capital.
The above factors that influence economic growth 
and economic development can be called “direct” fac-
tors because they immediately transform inputs into 
outputs. These factors are analyzed in the theoretical 
models of economic growth that show what the de-
terminants of long-run growth and the development 
level are.
However, the macroeconomic performances of 
countries do not depend exclusively on these direct 
determinants. There are also “deep” factors of produc-
tion that have an impact on the “direct” factors, and 
in this way, the deep factors affect the process of eco-
nomic growth and development. “Deep” determinants 
are institutions that provide the background for the 
interactions between measurable factor inputs and the 
level of output. 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we would like 
to choose the best concept of the index that measures 
the institutional environment. Such an index should fit 
the empirical data very well and be useful in explain-
ing the income differences of all of the countries in the 
world. We can select either one qualitative variable that 
is compiled by an international organization or a mix 
of such variables. Second, we would like to quantify the 
impact of institutions on countries’ development levels.
Most theoretical models of economic growth do not 
explicitly include institutions as growth determinants. 
Indeed, the macroeconomic production function in-
cludes only those quantitative variables that directly 
influence the level of output. 
In this paper, we would like to answer the title ques-
tion, which is the major research hypothesis: “To what 
extent the institutional environment is responsible for 
worldwide differences in economic development”. We 
do not intend to analyze whether institutions have an 
impact on economic development because the answer 
is obvious; our goal is to quantify their impact, i.e., to 
measure what part of the variance in economic devel-
opment can be attributed to a different institutional 
environment. We measure the level of economic devel-
opment by GDP per capita at purchasing power parity 
(PPP). Our study covers 153 countries.
The analysis is based on our own concept of the 
institutions-augmented Solow model. The standard 
Solow model (1956) includes only one type of capi-
tal according to the following production function: 
Y = F(K, L, A). Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) ex-
tended the Solow model by introducing another type 
of capital: human capital; to that end, they employed 
the following production function: Y = F(K, H, L, A). 
Nonneman and Vanhoudt (1996) further extended the 
Solow model by adding more types of capital. They an-
alyzed the model with three types of capital: physical 
capital, human capital and technological know-how. 
In our opinion, the value added of introducing 
more and more types of capital is diminishing. This 
decrease is occurring because economic growth and 
economic development depend not only on “direct” 
factors but also on “deep” determinants that are re-
lated to the institutional environment. Thus, we pro-
pose the extension of the macroeconomic production 
function in the way similar to the method of Non-
neman and Vanhoudt, but we argue that institutions 
should be included as new factors of production. 
Thus, we use the following production function: F(K, 
H, Q, L, A), where Q is the qualitative index that mea-
sures the institutional environment of a country. Our 
aim is to choose the best concept of such an index and 
to estimate the impact of institutions on the level of 
economic development.
The paper consists of seven sections. In section 2, we 
present a literature review that describes some other 
empirical studies on the institutions-growth nexus. 
Section 3 refers to the methodology that provides 
a  concise description of the Mankiw-Romer-Weil 
model and the institutions-augmented Solow model. 
Section 4 describes the data that were used. The results 
of the analysis are presented in sections 5 and 6. Sec-
tion 7 concludes.
2. A review of the literature on the 
institutions-growth nexus
There is no unique method for measuring institutions. 
For example, Sulejewicz (2009) provides many differ-
ent concepts of institutions. However, many of these 
concepts cannot be included in empirical studies that 
incorporate econometric techniques because some 
types of institutions are very hard to quantify. Thus, 
in empirical studies, researchers can only use a limited 
number of qualitative indicators that measure a given 
aspect of the institutional environment. Most of these 
indicators are related with economic freedom, the level Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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of democracy and political stability. Here, we would 
like to present the most important conclusions from 
the empirical literature on the institutions-growth 
nexus. This review of the empirical evidence will also 
justify our selection of variables.
There are many empirical studies that analyze the 
relationship between economic freedom and eco-
nomic growth, and most of them confirm the posi-
tive impact of economic freedom on macroeconomic 
performance. For example, de Haan and Sturm (2000) 
analyze 80 countries during 1975-90. They test two 
indices of economic freedom, which were compiled 
by the Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation/
Wall Street Journal. Their results suggest that whereas 
extending the scope of economic freedom accelerates 
economic growth, the initial level of economic free-
dom does not influence the GDP dynamics. Scully 
(2002) indicates that the index of economic freedom 
compiled by Gwartney, Lawson and Block revealed 
a  positive and significant impact on the economic 
growth of 26 highly developed economies and East-
Asian countries during 1975-90. The same positive 
relationship was found by Weede and Kämpf (2002), 
who analyzed 72 countries during 1970-95 using the 
index of economic freedom compiled by Gwartney, 
Lawson and Samida. 
Some authors build their own indices of economic 
freedom. Wu and Davis (1999) compile their own in-
dex based on the component indicators from the re-
search conducted by Gwartney, Lawson and Block. The 
results of their study suggest that economic freedom 
stimulated GDP growth for a large sample of countries 
(approximately 100) in the years 1975-1992. In addi-
tion, Heckelman and Stroup (2000) test the category 
indices of the Gwartney, Lawson and Block index of 
economic freedom, and their results indicate that not 
all of the component variables are positively correlated 
with economic growth for 49 countries during 1980-
1990. Thus, the authors propose their own variant, 
which is based on those variables that reveal a positive 
impact on the GDP. Sturm, Leertouwer and de Haan 
(2002) construct the index of economic freedom us-
ing factor analysis rather than arbitrary weights. How-
ever, their formula does not seem to be correlated 
with economic growth for 49 countries in the period 
1980-1990. Similar unexpected results were achieved 
by de Haan and Siermann (1998): these authors ana-
lyze nine indices of economic freedom compiled by 
Scully and Slottje for 78 countries during 1980-1992, 
and they find that the relationship between economic 
freedom and economic growth depends on the exact 
formula of the index of economic freedom. Specifi-
cally, whereas some variants are positively correlated 
with GDP growth, others are not. Instead of analyz-
ing the raw data, Pitlik (2002) analyzes the standard 
deviation of the time changes of the index of economic 
freedom compiled by the Fraser Institute. His results 
for 82 countries and the period 1975-1995 suggest that 
the greater stability of the liberalization path (that is, 
the lower standard deviation of economic freedom) 
positively affects countries’ macroeconomic perfor-
mance. The positive impact of economic freedom on 
economic development has also been found for post-
socialist countries, especially Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean economies, in many empirical studies (see, e.g., 
Rapacki, 2009; Rapacki & Próchniak, 2009; 2010). 
Empirical studies also focus on other measures of 
the institutional environment. There are many studies 
that include the variables that are related to political 
factors (inter alia, the level of democracy and politi-
cal stability). The general conclusion of these studies is 
that a stable and democratic environment is conducive 
to macroeconomic development. However, there are 
some deviations among particular studies from this 
general rule.
The most comprehensive cross-sectional study was 
conducted by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003). These 
authors analyze almost 100 countries during 1965-
1995, and their results suggest that the democracy 
indicator (which is measured by the electoral rights 
and taken from the Freedom House) reveals a non-
linear relationship with the growth rate of the GDP. 
Nonlinearities are also present in the case of another 
indicator provided by this institution, i.e., civil liber-
ties. In contrast, the quality of bureaucracy reveals 
a positive linear impact on the economic development. 
In addition, these authors test dummy variables that 
represent various institutions on a 0-1 scale, such as: 
colony dummies (British, French, Spanish/Portuguese 
and other), a landlocked dummy, and legal-structure 
dummies (British and French).
Plümper and Martin (2003) analyze the democracy 
level in 83 countries during the period 1975-1997. Ac-
cording to their research, democracy exhibits a non-20 Mariusz Próchniak
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linear relationship with economic growth. The high-
est GDP dynamics are recorded by those countries 
that have a moderate level of democracy. Rivera-Batiz 
(2002) tests the democracy index (i.e., the political 
rights index compiled by the Freedom House) as well 
as the quality of governance indicator compiled by 
Hall and Jones. This research, which was conducted 
for 59 countries in the years 1960-1990, confirms that 
the quality of governance positively and significantly 
affects the economic growth, whereas democracy only 
stimulates economic growth when it is related with 
improved governance. Leblang (1997) analyzes the 
democracy index according to Gurr for 91 countries 
during 1960-1989, and the results confirm that the ini-
tial level of democracy positively and significantly in-
fluences the GDP dynamics. Feng (1997) uses several 
institutional variables, such as the democracy level ac-
cording to Gurr, the democracy level according to Bol-
len and the probabilities of government changes. This 
analysis covers 96 countries in the years 1960-1980, 
and the results suggest that democracy has a twofold 
impact on economic growth: the direct impact is nega-
tive, whereas an indirect impact is positive because of 
influence on the probability of government changes. 
Moreover, important regular government changes fa-
vorably affect macroeconomic performance, whereas 
irregular changes have the opposite effect. Thus, de-
mocracy indirectly influences the GDP growth be-
cause it increases the probability of important regular 
government changes and lowers the probability of ir-
regular changes. Barro (1996) focuses on the political 
rights index compiled by Gastil and Bollen as well as 
on the rule-of-law index. The data for approximately 
100 countries and the period 1960-1994 indicate that   
political freedom is nonlinearly related with economic 
growth: given a low level of political rights, extending 
political rights stimulates economic growth; however, 
when a specified level of democracy has been achieved, 
any further extension of political rights negatively af-
fects the growth of output. In contrast, the rule-of-law 
index is positively and significantly correlated with the 
economic growth. Próchniak and Witkowski (2012a; 
2012b;  2013) analyze the impact of economic freedom 
and the level of democracy on GDP growth using an 
innovative method of Bayesian model averaging; they 
find that economic freedom is one of the main growth 
drivers in the EU.
In addition, there are several studies that verify the 
relationship between political stability and economic 
growth. For example, Asteriou and Siriopoulos (2000) 
analyze data for Greece during 1960-1995; Asteriou and 
Price (2001) focus on the UK in the years 1961-1997; and 
Fosu (2002) examines 31 Sub-Saharan African countries 
in the period 1960-1986. All of these studies confirm the 
existence of the negative relationship between political 
instability and economic development. Although the 
studies differ in terms of the variables used (inter alia, 
terrorist attacks, political strikes, coups d’états, political 
assassinations, the Falkland war and the Persian Gulf 
War), the results clearly indicate that political stability 
is conducive to economic development. Similarly, Chen 
and Feng (1996) analyze the probability of changing the 
regime (which is calculated based on the logit model), 
economic freedom and the number of political assassina-
tions using a sample of 88 countries during 1974-1990. 
According to their work, a higher probability of chang-
ing the regime, a greater number of political assassina-
tions and a lower scope of economic freedom are factors 
that hamper economic growth. However, Wu and Davis 
(1999) achieve opposite findings: they analyze the po-
litical stability index (compiled based on political rights 
and civil liberties from the work of Gastil) and apply it 
to approximately 100 countries during 1975-1992. They 
conclude that for a given level of economic freedom, the 
rate of economic growth does not depend on the level of 
political freedom. In an analysis that covers 105 countries 
in the period 1960-1989, Durham (1999) finds that the 
number of political parties in the government is not cor-
related with economic growth.
Some institutions are very hard to measure, and 
they require descriptive analysis rather than quantita-
tive (formal) models. For example, Hunt (2012a) ana-
lyzes the relationship between trust within a society 
and economic growth and shows that trust-promot-
ing, societal-level moral codes promote productivity 
and economic growth (see also Foss (2012) and Hunt 
(2012b) for further discussion).
In summation, the empirical evidence confirms an 
enormous impact of institutions on economic growth. 
Thus, when analyzing the sources of income-level dif-
ferences between countries from different parts of the 
world, we have to include institutional measures. This 
requirement is why we extend the Solow model to ac-
count for institutions.Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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3. Theoretical background and the 
methodology
In this part of the paper, we describe the determinants 
of economic development by referring to the family of 
Solow models. We begin with the Solow model that is 
extended for human capital (i.e., the Mankiw-Romer-
Weil model). Then, we show a further augmentation 
of the Solow model that incorporates a slightly modi-
fied version of the model proposed by Nonneman and 
Vanhoudt. It is our own concept, and we call it the in-
stitutions-augmented Solow model. This model consti-
tutes the main background for our empirical research.
(a) The Mankiw-Romer-Weil model
Let F be the production function. The factors of pro-
duction are as follows: physical capital K(t), human 
capital H(t) and effective labor A(t)L(t), which is the 
product of the level of technology (knowledge) A(t) 
and the size of the population (labor force) L(t):
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, FKt Ht AtLt . (1)
The production function exhibits constant returns to 
all three of the inputs (i.e., physical capital, human cap-
ital and effective labor) and the diminishing marginal 
product of both physical and human capital. One of 
the functions that satisfy these properties is the Cobb-
Douglas production function:
 
  F Kt Ht AtLt Kt Ht AtLt () () () () () () () () ()
1
,,
αβ αβ −−
= , (2)
where α > 0, β > 0, α + β < 1. The output may be devot-
ed to consumption, the accumulation of physical capi-
tal, or the accumulation of human capital. The level of 
technology and the size of the population both grow 
at constant exogenous rates that are equal to a and n, 
respectively:
( )
( )
At
a
At
=
￿
     and      ( )
( )
Lt
n
Lt
=
￿
. (3)
The increase of capital equals the investments minus 
the depreciation. Let sK be the investment rate in physi-
cal capital (i.e., the savings rate) and let sH be the in-
vestment rate in human capital. Both types of capital 
depreciate at the same constant rate δ. Hence, the re-
spective time paths of physical and human capital are 
as follows:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, K Kt sFKt Ht AtLt Kt δ =− ￿ , (4)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, H Ht sFKt Ht AtLt Ht δ =− ￿ . (5)
The analysis of the economy is carried out for the capi-
tal and the output per unit of effective labor, which are 
denoted by k(t), h(t) and f(k(t),h(t)):
K
k
AL
≡ ; 
H
h
AL
≡ ;  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
,,
, , , , ,1 ,
F K H AL K H AL
y f kh F Fkh f kh
AL AL AL AL
  ≡≡ = = =  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
,,
, , , , ,1 ,
F K H AL K H AL
y f kh F Fkh f kh
AL AL AL AL
  ≡≡ = = =  
 
. (6)
To find equations that describe the behavior of the 
economy, we differentiate the definitions of k and h 
(given by (6)) with respect to time. Then, we apply for-
mulas (3) – (6). Assuming that the production func-
tion is of the Cobb-Douglas form y = f(k, h) = kαhβ, we 
finally obtain
( ) ( ) KK ks y na ks k h na k
αβ δδ = − ++ = − ++ ￿ , (7)
( ) ( ) HH hs y na hs k h na h
αβ δδ = − ++ = − ++ ￿ . (8)
The above equations are the basic equations that de-
scribe the dynamics of the economy in the Mankiw-
Romer-Weil model. The increase of capital per unit of 
effective labor equals the real investments (sKy or sHy) 
minus the replacement investments ((n + a + δ)k or 
(n + a + δ)h). 
Based on the above formulas, we can graphically 
show the dynamics of the economy and the steady-
state, as in Figure 1.
The steady-state occurs at the point of intersection 
between dk/dt = 0 and dh/dt = 0. At this point, both 
types of capital and the output per unit of effective la-
bor are all constant. The steady-state is stable: regard-
less of the initial level of capital (unless it is zero), the 
economy tends to the steady-state (the changes of k 
and h are marked by arrows). 
Because in the steady-state both physical and hu-
man capital per unit of effective labor are constant, by 
setting (7) and (8) to zero we can calculate the amount 
of physical capital (k*) and human capital (h*) in the 
steady-state. By using the production function y = kαhβ 
and applying some mathematics, we finally obtain the 
steady-state level of output (y*):22 Mariusz Próchniak
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1
1 1
*
KH ss
k
na
ββ αβ
δ
− −− 
=  ++ 
;
 
1
1 1
*
HK ss
h
na
αα αβ
δ
− −− 
=  ++ 
;
11
*
KH ss
y
na na
αβ
αβ αβ
δδ
−− −−   =   ++ ++  
. (9)
Because the output per unit of effective labor (y) is 
equal to the per capita GDP (Y/L) divided by the 
level of technology (A), from (9) we can calculate the 
steady-state level of per capita output:
11
KH ss Y
A
L na na
αβ
αβ αβ
δδ
−− −−   =   ++ ++  
. (10)
Equation (10) shows the determinants of GDP per 
capita in the long-run equilibrium according to the 
Mankiw-Romer-Weil model. Apart from the variables 
A (the level of technology), a (the technical progress) 
and δ (the depreciation rate), which are very hard to 
measure, the per capita income depends on the savings 
rate, the investment rate in human capital and the popu-
lation growth. The relationship between the level of eco-
nomic development and the accumulation of physical 
and human capital is positive, whereas the relationship 
between the level of economic development and the 
growth rate of the population is negative. Thus, rich 
countries should record higher investment rates in both 
types of capital and slower population growth than poor 
countries. After taking logarithms, Formula (10) can be 
estimated as the following linear regression equation:
( ) ln ln ln ln ln
111
KH
Y
A s s na
L
α β αβ
δ
αβ αβ αβ
+  = + + − ++  −− −− −− 
( ) ln ln ln ln ln
111
KH
Y
A s s na
L
α β αβ
δ
αβ αβ αβ
+  = + + − ++  −− −− −− 
, (11)
where ln A is a constant and ln sK, ln sH and ln(n + a + δ) 
are explanatory variables.
It is worth noticing that if we substitute zeros for H, 
h, sH and β, then the above calculations are also valid 
for the standard Solow model. Equation (11), which 
describes the determinants of the income level in the 
steady-state for the basic Solow model, takes the form
( ) ln ln ln ln
11
K
Y
A s na
L
αα
δ
αα
 = + − ++  −− 
. (12)
32
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The above formula indicates that in the basic Solow 
model, the GDP per capita in the steady-state depends 
inter alia on the savings rate (with which it has a posi-
tive relationship) and the growth rate of the population 
(with which it has a negative relationship). Equation 
(12) can also be estimated as a linear regression model, 
which allows us to find the production function’s pa-
rameters.
(b) The institutions-augmented Solow model
Nonneman and Vanhoudt further extended the Solow 
model. They analyze the model with many inputs, each 
of which is a specified type of capital. The production 
function has the form
( )
12
1
1
12
m
i m
i m Y K K K AL
α α αα
=
−∑ = … , (13)
where  m represents the number of capital goods 
that are factors of production. In the standard Solow 
model, which only has physical capital, m = 1. The 
Mankiw-Romer-Weil model, which includes human 
capital, assumes that m = 2. Nonneman and Van-
houdt in their empirical study analyze a model with 
three inputs (m = 3): physical capital, human capital 
and technological know-how. 
However, as we argued in the introduction, the value 
that is added by introducing more types of capital is di-
minishing. This decreasing return is because economic 
growth and economic development depend not only 
on “direct” factors but also on “deep” determinants that 
are related to the institutional environment. Thus, we 
propose an extension of the macroeconomic produc-
tion function in a way that is similar to the extension 
of Nonneman and Vanhoudt, but we argue that institu-
tions should be included as new factors of production 
and not as different types of capital. Thus, we propose 
the following production function:
( )
1
Y K H AL Q
αβ αβ ζ −−
= , (14)
where Q is the qualitative index that measures the in-
stitutional environments of countries. One difference 
between our proposition (14) and the neoclassical 
production function is that our production function 
exhibits constant returns to all of the quantitative (di-
rect) inputs, i.e., physical capital, human capital and 
effective labor (the sum of the exponents is 1). The 
institutional index has a separate power of ζ because 
this variable refers to “deep” GDP determinants, which 
reveal an impact on direct GDP determinants. Thus, 
the exponent for the institutional variable should not 
be related to the rest of the exponents, which repre-
sent conventional inputs. If ζ → 0, the institutional fac-
tor tends to 1 and the output does not depend on the 
quality of institutions. In such a case, only measurable 
inputs determine the level of output.
Another issue is the behavior of Q. Both for sim-
plicity and due to reality, we do not analyze the insti-
tutional indicator as a time variable. Contrary to the 
capital and labor, we assume that institutions are con-
stant over time. In turn, the institutional environment 
does not fluctuate much from one year to another, 
unlike the remaining variables. Thus, the dynamics of 
the model will be analyzed only in (k, h) space. This 
restriction is of course a simplified assumption, but it 
facilitates the analysis very much.
Returning to the mathematical analysis of the mod-
el, the production function per unit of effective labor is
Y
y khQ
AL
αβ ζ = = . (15)
The time paths for the physical and human capital 
are derived in the same way as equations (7) and (8), 
which yields the following:
( ) ( ) KK ks y na ks k h Q na k
αβ ζ δδ = − ++ = − ++ ￿ , (16)
( ) ( ) HH hs y na hs k h Q na h
αβ ζ δδ = − ++ = − ++ ￿ . (17)
Using a similar analysis as before, the respective stocks 
of physical capital, human capital and output per unit 
of effective labor in the steady-state are as follows:
1
1 1
*
KH s sQ
k
na
ββ ζ αβ
δ
− −− 
=  ++ 
, (18)
1
1 1
*
HK s sQ
h
na
αα ζ αβ
δ
− −− 
=  ++ 
, (19)
11
1 *
KH ss
yQ
na na
αβ
ζ
αβ αβ
αβ
δδ
−− −−
−−   =   ++ ++  
. (20)
Equation (20) shows the determinants of GDP per 
capita in the long-run equilibrium according to the 
institutions-augmented Solow model. The per capita 24 Mariusz Próchniak
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income depends on both standard factors and on in-
stitutions. The relationship between the quality of 
institutions and the level of economic development 
is positive, which implies that countries with higher 
institutional qualities should be more developed than 
those with poor institutional environments.
Equation (20) can be logarithmized (similarly to 
equation (9) for the Mankiw-Romer-Weil model). This 
process yields
( ) ln ln ln ln ln ln
111 1
KH
Y
A s s na Q
L
α β αβ ζ
δ
αβ αβ αβ αβ
+  = + + − ++ +  −− −− −− −− 
( ) ln ln ln ln ln ln
111 1
KH
Y
A s s na Q
L
α β αβ ζ
δ
αβ αβ αβ αβ
+  = + + − ++ +  −− −− −− −− 
( ) ln ln ln ln ln ln
111 1
KH
Y
A s s na Q
L
α β αβ ζ
δ
αβ αβ αβ αβ
+  = + + − ++ +  −− −− −− −− 
 (21)
The above formula can be estimated as a linear regres-
sion equation, which allows us to verify and empiri-
cally quantify the impact of institutions on economic 
development. Some assumptions on the specification 
of the regression model and the methods of estimation 
have to be imposed. For example, Białowolski, Kusze-
wski and Witkowski (2010) assume that all of the mac-
roeconomic relationships are linear.
The estimation of equations (11), (12) and (21) is 
presented in section 6.
4. Data
Our analysis is entirely based on the family of Solow 
models. Thus, we empirically verify only those equa-
tions that can be derived from the theoretical analysis 
of the model, which is presented in section 3.
To analyze the determinants of economic development, 
we use equations (12), (11) and (21). The first formula rep-
resents the standard Solow model, the second formula is 
in line with the Mankiw-Romer-Weil model and the last 
formula corresponds to the institutions-augmented model. 
The regression equations can be estimated in two versions: 
unrestricted and restricted. Equation (21), for example, 
shows that the sum of the coefficients of the variables ln si 
should be equal in absolute terms to the coefficient of the 
variable ln(n + a + δ). However, a model that is estimated 
based on the real data need not share these properties. 
Hence, the regression equation that includes the variables 
ln si and ln(n + a +  δ) independently is known as the un-
restricted model. When estimating this model, the sum 
of the coefficients of the variables ln si does not have to be 
equal in absolute value to the coefficient of ln(n + a +  δ). 
However, this equality will hold in the restricted version of 
the equation, where the explanatory variables ln si and ln(n 
+ a +  δ) are interrelated. The restricted model is obtained 
by subtracting ln(n + a + δ) from each of the ln si variables. 
The details are presented in Table 1.
Table 1 is composed of three parts that represent the 
basic Solow model, the Mankiw-Romer-Weil model 
and the institutions-augmented Solow model in that or-
der. The first two rows specify the number of inputs and 
the production function, and the next two rows present 
the regression equations that are estimated using the or-
dinary least squares (OLS) method for the unrestricted 
and restricted model. In addition, the next row relates 
the regression coefficients with the production function 
parameters according to equations (11), (12) and (21). 
Finally, the last row shows the way in which we estimate 
the production function parameters.
Before conducting our calculations, we have to im-
pose one additional assumption. Equations (11), (12) 
and (21) include (inter alia) the technical progress and 
the depreciation rate. However, it is impossible to ob-
tain real values for these parameters in our sample of 
countries. Hence, we assume that the sum of the rate 
of technical progress and the depreciation rate equals 
0.05 (i.e., 5%), which is a  common assumption in 
such analyses and should not lower the reliability of 
the results with respect to the aim of our study (see, 
e.g., Mankiw, Romer, Weil, 1992; Murthy, Chien, 1997; 
Murthy, Upkolo, 1999; Nonneman, Vanhoudt, 1996).
The variable denoted by y in Table 1 represents the 
current level of economic development. We consider 
the economic development as a proxy for the GDP per 
capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) (in interna-
tional US dollars); this variable is taken from the Penn 
World Table (PWT) 7.0 database (Heston, Summers, & 
Aten, 2011). To be robust to business cycles and espe-
cially the global crisis of 2009 (Śledziewska, Witkowski 
(2012) analyze some of its effects), we define economic 
development as the average GDP per capita at PPP for 
the years 2005-2009, that is, over five years. This defini-
tion allows us to pass over the recession that in some 
countries, e.g., the Baltic states, led to a large drop in 
the GDP. Hence, ln y is the natural logarithm of the 
five-year average GDP per capita.
The explanatory variable sK is the average invest-
ment rate in physical capital for the period 1994-2009. 
The investment rate is measured as the ratio of the 
gross fixed capital formation to the GDP and is taken Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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Table 1. The determinants of GDP per capita according to various versions of the Solow model
The basic Solow model
Number of inputsa:   1 (physical capital)
Production function: ( )
1
Y K AL
α α −
=  or per unit of effective labor:   yk
α =
Unrestricted model:  ( ) 01 2 ln ln ln 0.05 K y sn αα α = +++
Restricted model:  ( ) ( ) 01 ln ln ln 0.05 K y sn αα = + −+
Regression coefficients: 0 α  – a constant,      1 1
α
α
α
=
−
,      2 1
α
α
α
= −
−
Estimation of the parameters
physical capital’s share in the income:
1
1
ˆ
1
α
α
α
=
+
The Mankiw-Romer-Weil model (the human capital-augmented Solow model)
Number of inputsa:  2 (physical capital, human capital)
Production function: ( )
1
Y K H AL
αβ αβ −−
=  or per unit of effective labor:    y kh
αβ =
Unrestricted model:  ( ) 01 2 3 ln ln ln ln 0.05 KH y ss n αα α α = ++++
Restricted model: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 01 2 ln ln ln 0,05 ln ln 0.05 KH y sn sn αα α = + −+ + −+
Regression coefficients: 0 α  – a constant,      1 1
α
α
αβ
=
−−
,      2 1
β
α
αβ
=
−−
,     
αβ
αβ
= −
−−
Estimation of the parameters
physical capital’s share in the income:
1
12
ˆ
1
α
α
αα
=
++
human capital’s share in the income:
2
12
ˆ
1
α
β
αα
=
++
The institutions-augmented Solow model
Number of inputsa:   3 (physical capital, human capital, institutions)
Production function: ( )
1
Y K H AL Q
αβ αβ ζ −−
=  or per unit of effective labor:  y khQ
αβ ζ =
Unrestricted model: ( ) 01 2 3 4 ln ln ln ln ln 0.05 KH y s sQn αα α α α = + + ++ +
Restricted model: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 01 2 3 ln ln ln 0,05 ln ln 0,05 ln KH y sn sn Q αα α α = + −+ + −+ +
Regression coefficients: 0 α  – a constant,  1 1
α
α
αβ
=
−−
,  2 1
β
α
αβ
=
−−
,  3 1
ζ
α
αβ
=
−−
,  4 1
αβ
α
αβ
+
= −
−−
Estimation of the parameters
physical capital’s share in income:
1
12
ˆ
1
α
α
αα
=
++
human capital’s share in income:
2
12
ˆ
1
α
β
αα
=
++
the institutional share: ( ) 3 ˆˆ ˆ 1 ζα αβ = −−
Notes:
a Apart from the effective labor. 26 Mariusz Próchniak
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from the World Development Indicators (WDI) data-
base (World Bank, 2011a).
The growth rate of the population (n) is the differ-
ence between the natural logarithms of the population 
levels in 2009 and 1994 divided by 15 (the number of 
years between 1994 and 2009). This variable comes 
from the WDI.
The investment rate in human capital is not so easy 
to find, as there is no unique and commonly accepted 
measure of human capital. In empirical studies, many 
indices are used depending on the research methodol-
ogy and data availability. For the purposes of our anal-
ysis, we estimate the variable sH by various methods to 
choose the best variant. The investment rate in human 
capital has been calculated in eight distinct variants:
•  public spending on education (% of GDP) – edu;
•  secondary school enrollment (% gross) – enrol_sec;
•  tertiary school enrollment (% gross) – enrol_ter;
•  average years of tertiary schooling (age 25+)   
– years_ter;
•  average years of total schooling (age 25+) – years_tot;
•  percentage of the population (age 25+) that has 
completed a tertiary education – pop_ter;
•  duration of compulsory education (years) – dur_comp;
•  labor force with a tertiary education (% of total)   
– lab_ter.
All the above variables have been calculated as arith-
metic averages for the period 1994-2009 (in the event 
of missing values, the average covers a shorter period). 
The human capital figures are taken from the World 
Bank’s WDI (the variables edu,  enrol_sec,  enrol_ter 
and  lab_ter) or Education Statistics (the variable 
dur_comp) databases, or from the Barro-Lee dataset, 
which is available in the Education Statistics databank 
(the variables years_ter, years_tot and pop_ter) (World 
Bank, 2011a; 2011b).
With regard to institutions, the selection of variables 
is even more difficult. There is no widely accepted view 
on how to measure institutions. Moreover, some types 
of institutions cannot be quantified at all. In this re-
search, we use six qualitative indicators that represent 
the following areas of the institutional environment: 
democracy, the governance, economic freedom and 
the ease of doing business. More specifically, we con-
sider the following indicators (Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2011; Fraser Institute, 2011; Freedom House, 
2011; Heritage Foundation, 2011; World Bank, 2011c; 
2011d):
•  democracy index (2008; Economist Intelligence 
Unit) – dem_eiu;
•  democracy index with respect to political rights 
(avg. for 1994-2009; Freedom House) – dem_pr;
•  governance indicator (avg. for 1996, 1998, 2000, 
2002-2009; World Bank) – gov;
•  index of economic freedom (avg. for 1995-2009; 
Heritage Foundation) – ef_hf;
•  index of economic freedom (avg. for 1995, 2000 
-2008; Fraser Institute) – ef_fi;
•  ease of doing business index (2009; World Bank)   
– doing_b.
Many of the above indices are the most commonly 
used institutional indicators in the empirical studies 
on economic growth (see the review of the literature 
presented in section 2). We tried to calculate them as 
averages for the period 1994-2009. However, many of 
the variables are not available for all these years. Never-
theless, we decided to choose the institutional indica-
tor even if it is only available for one year (e.g., dem_eiu 
or doing_b). This decision is justified because institu-
tions do not change much during a short time period, 
and hence, we may assume that the value for the last 
available year is also valid for the previous years.
The democracy index published by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit is a qualitative variable that ranges 
between 0 and 10, where 10 means the best outcome 
was achieved. This index is based on the ratings for 60 
indicators grouped into five categories: the electoral 
process and pluralism, the functioning of government, 
political participation, the political culture and civil 
liberties. The overall democracy index is the simple 
average of these five category indexes.
The democracy variable that was taken from the Free-
dom House measures the political rights. Following the 
methodology of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003, p. 528), 
we treat the political rights as the proxy for the level of 
democracy, and we call it the democracy index. (Free-
dom House publishes two indices: political rights and 
civil liberties.) The original indicator ranges between 1 
and 7, where 1 means the best outcome was achieved.
The World Bank publishes data on governance 
that cover six areas: voice and accountability, political 
stability and the absence of violence, government ef-Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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fectiveness, the regulatory quality, the rule of law and 
the control of corruption. The governance indicator 
included in our analysis has been calculated by us as 
the simple arithmetic average of these six component 
indices. The indicator ranges between –2.5 and +2.5, 
and a higher value corresponds to a better outcome.
The Heritage Foundation index of economic free-
dom is an arithmetic average of the following 10 cat-
egory indices: business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal 
freedom, government spending, monetary freedom, 
investment freedom, financial freedom, property 
rights, freedom from corruption and labor freedom. 
All these indicators range between 0 and 100, and 
a higher value is the desirable outcome because it rep-
resents a greater scope of economic freedom.
Another index of economic freedom is compiled by 
the Fraser Institute. It is a qualitative variable composed 
of five indicators: (a) the size of government, (b) the legal 
structure and security of property rights, (c) the access 
to sound money, (d) the freedom to trade internation-
ally, (e) the regulation of credit, labor and business. This 
variable ranges between 0 and 10, and a higher outcome 
represents greater economic freedom.
The ease of doing business index measures a coun-
try’s worldwide rank (with first place being the best). 
A good outcome means that the regulatory environ-
ment is conducive to business operations. This indi-
cator is the average of the component indicators that 
cover the following areas: starting a business, dealing 
with construction permits, registering property, ob-
taining credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trad-
ing across borders, enforcing contracts and closing 
a business.
As demonstrated, the above institutional indicators 
take values from different scales. Thus, for compara-
bility purposes, all of them have been recalculated by 
us into the 0-100 scale, where 100 represents the best 
(most desirable) outcome.
5. Some empirics on human capital 
accumulation and the quality of 
institutions
In this section, we verify the relationships among the 
variables that are tested in our study using a number 
of econometric techniques. First, we analyze the mu-
tual correlation of some explanatory variables. Then, 
we test the relationship between the quality of the 
institutional environment and the level of economic 
development.
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix between all 
eight of the human capital measures. As demonstrated, 
our initial selection of these variables is quite good. Al-
most all of the correlations are statistically significant 
(insignificance appears only twice), which means that 
all of the selected variables perform very well in mea-
suring the investment in (or the stock of) human capi-
tal. The countries that are abundant in human capital 
have on average higher values of all of the variables.
However, for the sake of conciseness, for further 
analysis we choose one variable that represents human 
capital: the tertiary school enrollment ratio (enrol_ter). 
The selection of this variable is based on two criteria.
The first criterion is the economic significance of 
this variable. In our opinion, the years of schooling, 
the percentage of the population that has completed 
a given level of education or the intensity of school at-
tendance are better proxies for the human capital stock 
(or investment) than the public expenditure on educa-
tion (edu). Our opinion was formed for two reasons: 
first, public spending does not include private expendi-
tures, which in some countries (e.g., the United States) 
play an important role in human capital accumulation; 
second, the level of public expenditure does not tell us 
anything about the effectiveness of investment outlays. 
That is why we decided to ignore the edu variable in 
our analysis. Moreover, the correlation matrix indi-
cates that although edu is statistically significant, it is 
not strongly correlated with the remaining variables 
(due to low values of the coefficients).
The second criterion of our selection is the statisti-
cal significance. All the variables except edu are highly 
mutually correlated (the correlation coefficients even 
approach 0.8-0.9). However, because lab_ter is only 
available for a relatively small number of countries, it 
should be excluded. From the rest of the variables, we 
select enrol_ter (the tertiary school enrolment ratio) for 
further analysis, and we take into account a slightly ar-
bitrary choice but also a high number of observations 
(153 is the maximum possible number of observations).
Now, let us analyze the results for the second group 
of variables, that is, the institutional indicators. Table 3 
presents the respective correlation matrix.
It turns out that all of the selected institutional mea-
sures are strongly and significantly correlated with 28 Mariusz Próchniak
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Table 2. The correlation coefficients between various measures of human capital
Table 3. The correlation coefficients between various measures of the institutional environment
ln(edu) ln(enrol_sec) ln(enrol_ter) ln(years_ter) ln(years_tot) ln(pop_ter) ln(dur_comp) ln(lab_ter)
ln(edu)
1.0000 
(153)
0.2445***
 (153)
0.1620** 
(153)
0.0655 
(129)
0.1741** 
(129)
0.0626 
(129)
0.2605***
 (153)
0.1520* 
(93)
ln(enrol_sec)
0.2445*** 
(153)
1.0000 
(153)
0.8609*** 
(153)
0.8183*** 
(129)
0.8506*** 
(129)
0.7941*** 
(129)
0.5650*** 
(153)
0.7695*** 
(93)
ln(enrol_ter)
0.1620** 
(153)
0.8609*** 
(153)
1.0000 
(153)
0.8797*** 
(129)
0.7611***
 (129)
0.8567***
 (129)
0.5097*** 
(153)
0.7784*** 
(93)
ln(years_ter)
0.0655 
(129)
0.8183*** 
(129)
0.8797*** 
(129)
1.0000 
(129)
0.8104*** 
(129)
0.9851*** 
(129)
0.4880*** 
(129)
0.8208*** 
(84)
ln(years_tot)
0.1741** 
(129)
0.8506*** 
(129)
0.7611*** 
(129)
0.8104*** 
(129)
1.0000 
(129)
0.7893*** 
(129)
0.5022*** 
(129)
0.7069*** 
(84)
ln(pop_ter)
0.0626 
(129)
0.7941*** 
(129)
0.8567*** 
(129)
0.9851*** 
(129)
0.7893*** 
(129)
1.0000 
(129)
0.4658***
 (129)
0.7880***
 (84)
ln(dur_
comp)
0.2605*** 
(153)
0.5650*** 
(153)
0.5097*** 
(153)
0.4880*** 
(129)
0.5022*** 
(129)
0.4658*** 
(129)
1.0000 
(153)
0.4793*** 
(93)
ln(lab_ter)
0.1520* 
(93)
0.7695***
 (93)
0.7784*** 
(93)
0.8208***
 (84)
0.7069*** 
(84)
0.7880*** 
(84)
0.4793*** 
(93)
1.0000 
(93)
ln(dem_eiu) ln(dem_pr) ln(gov) ln(ef_hf) ln(ef_fi) ln(doing_b)
ln(dem_eiu) 1.0000 (143) 0.7230*** (143) 0.7974*** (143) 0.6770*** (142) 0.6776*** (110) 0.6117*** (140)
ln(dem_pr) 0.7230*** (143) 1.0000 (153) 0.5471*** (153) 0.6025*** (148) 0.4438*** (112) 0.2764*** (150)
ln(gov) 0.7974*** (143) 0.5471*** (153) 1.0000 (153) 0.8106*** (148) 0.8316*** (112) 0.6643*** (150)
ln(ef_hf) 0.6770*** (142) 0.6025*** (148) 0.8106*** (148) 1.0000 (148) 0.8763*** (111) 0.6012*** (145)
ln(ef_fi) 0.6776*** (110) 0.4438*** (112) 0.8316*** (112) 0.8763*** (111) 1.0000 (112) 0.6705*** (111)
ln(doing_b) 0.6117*** (140) 0.2764*** (150) 0.6643*** (150) 0.6012*** (145) 0.6705*** (111) 1.0000 (150)
Notes:
The number of observations (countries) is in brackets.
***  The correlation is significant at the 1% level.
**  The correlation is significant at the 10% level.
*  The correlation is significant at the 15% level.
Notes:
The number of observations (countries) is in brackets.
***  The correlation is significant at the 1% level.Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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each other. The data in Table 3 indicate that all the 
correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Although the coefficients range between 0.2764 and 
0.8763, most of them are in the range 0.6-0.8, which 
confirms that there is a very strong relationship be-
tween these variables.
Hence, we reach two conclusions. First, all of the 
qualitative indicators are very good proxies for the in-
stitutional environment. It is unlikely that such a good 
correlation for a large sample of countries is spurious. 
Second, various types of institutions are of a compa-
rable quality in the same country. Thus, there are only 
a few countries that perform extraordinarily well in 
terms of, e.g., economic freedom, but reveal poor gov-
ernance and/or have unfriendly business regulations. 
The typical country has institutions that have devel-
oped similarly. For example, if a given country exhibits 
a large scope of economic freedom, it is very likely that 
it will also be characterized by a high quality of gover-
nance, business-friendly regulations and a high level 
of democracy. Of course, from the statistical point of 
view, these results are partly biased because the quali-
tative institutional indicators are composed of the 
category indices that can be the same across a num-
ber of aggregate institutional measures (for example, 
corruption is included in both the index of economic 
freedom and the governance indicator). 
As we know that all the institutional indicators are 
strongly mutually correlated, let us switch to the title 
topic of the analysis. We must verify the relationship 
between the institutional environment and the level 
of economic development. We assess this link using 
the regression analysis, which allows us to quantify 
to what extent differences in institutions can explain 
differences in income levels between the various coun-
tries in the world.
The existing literature (e.g., Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 
2003, p. 529) suggests that the relationship between 
some institutional variables and economic growth can 
be nonlinear. Hence, to check for eventual nonlineari-
ties, we estimate both linear and nonlinear regression 
models of the following form:
01 yQ ηη = + , (22)
2
01 2 y QQ ηη η = ++ , (23)
where y is the GDP per capita at PPP (the average for 
2005-2009), Q represents the institutional variable (in 
the 0 to 100 scale), and η0, η1 and η2 are regression coef-
ficients. The results are presented in Figures 2-7.
Figures 2-7 illustrate the relationship between the 
level of economic development (the vertical axis) and 
the quality of the institutional environment (the hori-
zontal axis). The points given on the charts represent 
the positions of individual countries (there are too 
many countries to put their names on the chart). Lux-
embourg and Qatar are not marked on the chart be-
cause of their extremely high GDPs per capita ($82,058 
and $125,536, respectively), but naturally they are in-
cluded in the regression models. The estimated regres-
sion equations are listed at the top of the figure. The 
trend lines (for both the linear and nonlinear models) 
are plotted on the chart. The variables y and Q shown 
on both axes are not logarithmized to make the figures 
clearer to the reader. From the figure, we can see the 
range of income levels and the quality of the institu-
tions of all the countries in the world that we exam-
ined. As some data are missing, the number of obser-
vations (countries) is listed below the chart.
The regression analysis provides us with very inter-
esting findings. It turns out that institutions matter: the 
countries with better institutional environments are on 
average more developed, which is surely not a random 
result. The calculations cover almost all of the coun-
tries in the world. Each figure confirms a positive re-
lationship between the level of development and the 
quality of the local institutions. The strength and the 
shape of this link is (of course) different, but the cor-
relation is evidently positive regardless of the indica-
tor. More democratic countries are on average better 
developed; the countries with better governance tend 
to be richer; the countries that are more economically 
free enjoy clearly higher income levels; lastly, a high 
GDP per capita implies a large scope for the ease of 
doing business.
Let us analyze the details of the results. We see that 
the level of democracy has a nonlinear relationship 
with economic development. The R2 coefficient for 
the nonlinear model equals 34.8% (for the Econo-
mist Intelligence Unit index) and 24.0% (for the index 
compiled by Freedom House), which are significantly 
higher than the corresponding coefficients for the 
linear model (17.0% and 9.2%, respectively). Hence, 
linear approximation is not helpful in explaining dif-
ferences in economic development. In our opinion, 30 Mariusz Próchniak
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Figure 2 
The relationship between the level of democracy and the economic development 
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dem_eiu: Democracy index, 2008 (0 to 100; 100=more democratic) (Economist Intelligence Unit)
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143 countries. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Figure 3 
The relationship between the level of democracy and the economic development 
y = 7,0832x2 - 632,04x + 17269
R2 = 0,2396
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dem_pr : Democracy index - political rights, 1994-2009 avg. (0 to 100; 100=more democratic) (Freedom House)
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Source: Own calculations. 
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Figure 4 
The relationship between the quality of governance and the economic development 
y = 10,05x2 - 441,28x + 7320
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gov: Governance indicator, 1996-2009 avg. (0 to 100; 100=better governance) (World Bank)
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Figure 2. The relationship between the level of democracy and the economic development
Note: 143 countries.
Figure 3. The relationship between the level of democracy and the economic development
Note: 153 countries.
Figure 4. The relationship between the quality of governance and the economic development
Note: 153 countries.Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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Figure 5 
The relationship between economic freedom and the economic development 
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ef_hf: Index of economic freedom, 1995-2009 avg. (0 to 100; 100=greater freedom) (Heritage Foundation)
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Figure 6 
The relationship between economic freedom and the economic development 
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ef_fi : Index of economic freedom, 1995-2008 avg. (0 to 100; 100=greater freedom) (Fraser Institute)
G
D
P
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
 
a
t
 
P
P
P
,
 
2
0
0
5
-
2
0
0
9
 
a
v
g
112 countries. 
Source: Own calculations. 
38
Figure 7 
The relationship between the ease of doing business and the economic development 
y = 4,592x2 - 154,12x + 5261,5
R2 = 0,3295
y = 321,78x - 3390,3
R2 = 0,312
0
10 000
20 000
30 000
40 000
50 000
60 000
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
doing_b : Ease of doing business index, 2009 (0 to 100; 100=most business-friendly regulations) (World Bank)
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Figure 5. The relationship between economic freedom and the economic development
Note: 148 countries.
Figure 6. The relationship between economic freedom and the economic development
Note: 112 countries.
Figure 7. The relationship between the ease of doing business and the economic development
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these findings are not spurious. Instead, they result 
from the fact that many countries of the Arab world 
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates) are not democratic but still record high 
income levels. This characteristic exists because these 
countries earn a large part of their income from oil ex-
ports. In such a case, a high GDP per capita can be 
achieved despite a non-democratic environment. 
The model that shows an impact of the quality of 
governance on economic development has a very good 
fit to the empirical data in both the linear and non-
linear approaches. The R2 coefficient equals 44.6% for 
a linear equation and 47.9% for a nonlinear one. These 
high R-squares suggest that differences in the quality 
of governance have enormous power in explaining 
worldwide differences in economic development. It 
turns out that almost 50% of the differences in the in-
come levels can be attributed to differences in the qual-
ity of governance. Because the data are available for all 
the countries that are included in our sample (153), 
they are not spurious. Thus, good governance matters 
and is important for economic growth. In addition, 
positive outcomes in terms of voice and accountabil-
ity, political stability, the absence of violence, govern-
ment effectiveness, the quality of regulations and the 
control of corruption all have a significant impact on 
economic development. 
The quality of governance is closely linked with 
economic freedom. Indeed, this variable is also im-
portant in stimulating GDP. The two analyzed indi-
ces of economic freedom (which were taken from the 
Heritage Foundation and the Fraser Institute) reveal 
a strong and positive correlation with the per capita 
income. Both linear and nonlinear models fit the em-
pirical points well with R2 coefficients at the levels of 
29.4% and 36.4% for the Heritage Foundation index 
and 45.7% and 32.8% for the Fraser Institute indicator, 
respectively. The nonlinear model is of a similar qual-
ity for both indices, whereas the linear equation gives 
better results in the case of the Fraser Institute index. 
Regardless of the specification, the differences in eco-
nomic freedom explain approximately 30-40% of the 
differences in economic development. This result is not 
spurious because more economically free countries 
have the necessary preconditions for being rich than 
countries with low scopes of economic freedom.
The last index is the ease of doing business, and it 
also confirms the importance of high-quality institu-
tions in fostering economic development. The coun-
tries that have more business-friendly regulations are 
on average richer than the remaining ones. The econo-
metric results suggest that differences in the ease of 
doing business explain approximately 30% of the dif-
ferences in the level of economic development among 
the countries of the world. These results hold for both 
the linear and nonlinear models.
In summation, our analysis clearly gives important 
and interesting advice to politicians and policy makers. 
Each government should act to improve all the areas 
of the local institutional environment, especially the 
quality of governance, the economic freedom and the 
ease of doing business. All these variables explain an 
enormous part of the worldwide differences in income 
levels and are necessary for economic development. 
The components of our institutional indicators specify 
the exact areas that should be improved and strength-
ened by governments. Without positive changes in the 
institutional environment, it is very difficult for societ-
ies to achieve strong and sustainable economic growth. 
To enrich a country, its policy makers should focus on 
those institutional reforms that affect the GDP via sup-
ply-side and demand-side determinants. 
6. Empirical verification of the 
institutions-augmented Solow model
We verify the institutions-augmented Solow model 
using the equations presented in Table 1. According 
to this model, the level of economic development de-
pends on the investment rates in physical and human 
capital, the quality of institutions and the growth rate 
of the population. The relationships between economic 
development and both the capital accumulation and 
the institutional environment are obviously positive, 
while the link with the population growth should be 
negative. To check the robustness of the results, we ver-
ify not only the institutions-augmented Solow model 
but also the standard Solow model and the Mankiw-
Romer-Weil model.
Table 4 illustrates the empirical estimation of the 
equations presented in Table 1. Panel a  represents 
unrestricted regressions, whereas panel b includes re-
stricted variants. The respective columns of the table 
concern the three tested types of the model. The basic 
Solow model includes one type of capital as the explan-Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
33 To What Extent Is the Institutional Environment Responsible for Worldwide Differences in Economic Development
Table 4. The regression results for the determinants of GDP per capita
(a) Unrestricted models
The Solow model The Mankiw-Romer-Weil model
The institutions-augmented 
Solow model
ln sK 1.253 0.877 0.539
t = 3.63;     p = 0.000 t = 3.83;     p = 0.000 t = 2.80;     p = 0.006
ln sH 0.908 0.669
t = 14.01;     p = 0.000 t = 11.13;     p = 0.000
ln Q 1.557
t = 8.55;     p = 0.000
ln(n + 0.05) –2.378 1.240 1.244
t = –4.61;     p = 0.000 t = 2.91;     p = 0.004 t = 3.55;     p = 0.001
constant –1.618 7.084 2.773
t = –0.97;     p = 0.333 t = 5.62;     p = 0.000 t = 2.41;     p = 0.017
R2 adj. 19.7% 65.1% 76.5%
R2 20.8% 65.8% 77.1%
n 153 153 153
F F = 19.65;     p = 0.000 F = 95.59;     p = 0.000 F = 124.65;     p = 0.000
Estimated values of the parameters
α 0.556 0.315 0.244
β 0.326 0.303
ζ 0.705
Estimated values of the parameters – the average for three models
α = 0.372;     β = 0.315;     ζ = 0.705
(b) Restricted models
The Solow model The Mankiw-Romer-Weil model
The institutions-augmented 
Solow model
ln sK – ln(n + 0.05) 1.624 0.286 0.036
t = 5.99;     p = 0.000 t = 1.26;     p = 0.208 t = 0.19;     p = 0.846
ln sH – ln(n + 0.05) 0.696 0.477
t = 11.82;     p = 0.000 t = 8.78;     p = 0.000
ln Q 1.715
t = 8.68;     p = 0.000
constant -0.670 3.324 –0.639
t = -0.42;     p = 0.672 t = 2.79;     p = 0.006 t = –0.59;     p = 0.553
R2 adj. 18.7% 57.6% 71.7%
R2 19.2% 58.2% 72.2%
n 153 153 153
F F = 35.88;     p = 0.000 F = 104.25;     p = 0.000 F = 129.03;     p = 0.000
Estimated values of the parameters
α 0.619 0.144 0.024
β 0.351 0.315
ζ 1.133
Estimated values of the parameters – the average for three models
α = 0.262;     β = 0.333;     ζ = 1.13334 Mariusz Próchniak
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atory variable: ln sK; the Mankiw-Romer-Weil model 
includes two such variables: ln sK and ln sH; lastly, the 
institutions-augmented Solow model includes ln sK, ln 
sH and the institutional indicator ln Q. The top rows 
of the table show the regression coefficients with t-sta-
tistics and p-values. Below, there are R-squares (both 
standard and adjusted), the number of observations 
(n) and the results of the F test. The bottom part pres-
ents the estimated parameters of the production func-
tion. The last row includes the average values of these 
parameters (in the case of β and ζ, the average is based 
on a limited number of equations).
The data in Table 4 indicate that all the types of the 
Solow model perform extraordinarily well in explain-
ing worldwide income-level differences. This property 
particularly holds for the unrestricted regressions. For 
each unrestricted equation, all the coefficients (except 
those for the population growth) have the correct (ex-
pected) sign and are statistically significant. Thus, our 
study has clearly confirmed that the accumulation of 
both types of capital and the quality of the institutional 
environment are positively related with the level of 
economic development. These results are very valuable 
and seem to be consistent with reality.
Referring to the unrestricted regressions, which give 
more reliable results in our opinion, the investment 
rate in physical capital positively affects the creation 
of GDP. In all the regression equations, this variable 
is highly significant with a p-value less than 0.01. The 
countries that devote large parts of their income to in-
vestments are on average richer than those countries 
that have low investment rates.
Similarly, human capital accumulation also plays an 
important role in enhancing economic development. 
In both considered models, the human capital variable 
is extraordinarily significant (with t-statistics exceed-
ing 10 and p-values of 0.000). Such an outcome is not 
spurious and emphasizes the enormous impact of hu-
man capital formation on economic development. As 
a result, countries that want to be rich should invest in 
education (in both qualitative and quantitative terms); 
of course, they should invest not only in tertiary edu-
cation, which is included in the regression equations, 
but also in secondary and primary education. Our 
study shows that human capital is the most important 
variable that is responsible for economic development. 
Indeed, without a sufficient stock of human capital, it is 
very hard for a society to develop institutions that are 
favorable for economic development.
The institutions-augmented Solow model confirms 
a positive and significant impact of the quality of insti-
tutions, which is measured by the governance indica-
tor on economic development. The variable ln Q that 
enters the third model has a positive coefficient with 
a p-value of 0.000. This result confirms our earlier re-
sults on the crucial role of institutions in stimulating 
economic development. There are very few rich coun-
tries with unfriendly institutions. The significance of 
institutions is comparable to the importance of the hu-
man capital accumulation.
It is worth comparing the R2 coefficients of the re-
spective models, and the results are very interesting. 
We focus on adjusted R-squares. According to the 
basic Solow model, the differences in the investment 
rate (as well as the population growth) explain 20% of 
the differences in the worldwide income levels, which 
is not particularly revealing. However, if we introduce 
human capital, this figure increases to 65%. In other 
words, approximately 2/3 of the worldwide variety in 
GDP per capita can be explained by physical and hu-
man capital accumulation. This number rises further 
when we consider the institutions-augmented Solow 
model. Based on this model, the differences in physical 
capital, human capital and the quality of the institu-
tional environment explain approximately 75% of the 
income differentiation among the world’s countries.
The last figure is extremely high. Almost all of the 
worldwide development differences can be explained 
by three variables: physical capital accumulation, hu-
man capital accumulation and the quality of institu-
tions. Hence, the institutions-augmented Solow model 
works very well; indeed, it is clearly superior to the ba-
sic Solow model, which only includes physical capital.
The above results imply that rich countries usually 
invest more in physical and human capital and have 
more developed institutions than poor countries. In 
other words, if a given country exhibits large invest-
ment rates, popular and high-quality education and 
a favorable institutional environment, then it is very 
likely that this country will be rich.
Of course, in interpreting these results we assume 
that the theoretical causal relationship between the ex-
planatory variables and the level of economic develop-
ment is as follows: the past values of the explanatory Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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variables affect the current state of development. In re-
ality, many macroeconomic relationships have mutual 
causality. Hence, it is worth noticing that rich coun-
tries also have greater opportunities to save, to invest 
in human capital and to have friendly regulations and 
institutions just because they are rich. 
As we mentioned earlier, our main findings are 
based on unrestricted regression equations. However, 
it is worth adding that restricted models yield similar 
results to the unrestricted ones, with one exception. In 
restricted regressions, the coefficient of the variable 
that represents the interaction between the physical 
capital accumulation and the population growth turns 
out to be insignificant in both the Mankiw-Romer-
Weil model and the institutions-augmented Solow 
model. However, this result does not violate our earlier 
findings relative to the aim of the analysis. The coef-
ficient of the institutional indicator in the restricted 
regression is still positive and highly significant, and 
hence, the quality of the institutional environment 
has a strong impact on the economic development. 
Second, according to the restricted regression, the 
differences in physical and human capital accumula-
tion as well as the quality of institutions still explain 
more than 70% of the differences in worldwide income 
levels. This result confirms the good properties and 
empirical implications of the institutions-augmented 
Solow model.
Lastly, we estimate the production function. To be 
robust to different specifications of the set of explana-
tory variables, we calculate the final values of the pa-
rameters as arithmetic averages for various variants of 
the Solow model. According to the unrestricted regres-
sion equations, the labor share in the income ranges 
between 0.244 and 0.556 and has an average of 0.372. 
The human capital share in the income is of a compa-
rable level in both models (0.326 and 0.303), which 
yields a mean value of 0.315. The institutional share 
amounts to 0.705. Hence, the production function is 
the following:
0.372 0.315 0.313 0.705 YK H LQ = . (24)
The exponent for L is calculated as 1 – α – β (in line with 
the assumption of constant returns to K, H and L).
The above formula seems to be reliable. The physi-
cal capital, human capital and labor shares in income 
are approximately 1/3 each, which is consistent with the 
empirical data for many countries. The institutions are 
more important in forming the GDP: the institutional 
elasticity of the output equals 0.705.
The production function for restricted regressions 
can be derived in an analogous way. It has the follow-
ing form:
0.262 0.333 0.405 1.133 YK H LQ = . (25)
The powers of the measurable inputs (K, H and L) are 
at comparable levels to formula (24) (any discrepancies 
that appear are statistical). The only significant change 
concerns the institutional share. In production func-
tion (25), the institutional elasticity of output is signifi-
cantly higher (1.133), which means that institutions 
play an even more important role in forming the GDP, 
as suggested by equation (24).
Overall, our study gives some valuable recommen-
dations for politicians and policy makers. Govern-
ments should focus on improving the institutional 
environment, investing in education and stimulating 
investments. The empirical analysis clearly confirms 
that these factors are necessary for rapid economic 
development.
7. Summary
This study aims to assess to what extent the institu-
tional environment is responsible for the worldwide 
differences in economic development. To answer this 
question, we build our own concept of the institutions-
augmented Solow model. Our analysis covers 153 
countries and the period 1994-2009.
The empirical analysis confirms a large positive im-
pact of the quality of the institutional environment on 
the level of economic development, which is measured by 
the 2005-2009 GDP per capita at PPP. The positive link 
has been evidenced for all six of the institutional indica-
tors: two democracy indices, two indices of economic 
freedom, a governance indicator and the ease of doing 
business index. The relationship is linear, although some 
nonlinearities are present in the case of democracy.
Our own concept of the institutions-augmented 
Solow model fits the empirical data very well. The em-
pirical verification of this model for 153 countries con-
firms that physical and human capital accumulation 
and the quality of the institutions, which are measured 36 Mariusz Próchniak
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by the governance indicator, have a positive impact on 
the economic development. It turns out that the dif-
ferences in physical capital, human capital and the in-
stitutional environment explain approximately 75% of 
the differences in economic development among the 
world’s countries.
According to the institutions-augmented Solow mod-
el, the production function that is consistent with unre-
stricted regressions is Y = K0.372H0.315L0.313Q0.705, whereas 
the function that is consistent with restricted regres-
sions has the following form: Y = K0.262H0.333L0.405Q1.133, 
where Q denotes the institutional indicator.
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